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T Y F E 1878 P
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!e Rhodes Historical Review showcases outstanding undergraduate history research taking place at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. Phi Alpha !eta (!e National History Honor Society) and the Department of History at Rhodes College publish !e Rhodes Historical Review annually. !e Rhodes Historical Review is produced entirely by a four-member student editorial board and can be found in the Ned R. McWherter Library at !e University of Memphis, the Benjamin L. Hooks Central Public Library of Memphis, and !e Paul J. Barret Jr. Library at Rhodes College.

Submission Policy: In the fall, the editors begin soliciting submissions for essays 3,000-6,000 words in length. Editors welcome essays from any department and from any year in which the author is enrolled; however, essays must retain a

corruption by local o"cials had drained the city's budget. By 1878, the financial situation had become increasingly dire: the city had accumulated five million dollars of debt and was on the brink of total insolvency, attempting to take out new loans and bonds to make good on its original debts. In 1878, Memphis remained focused on economic concerns, attempting to maintain commercial growth while avoiding the financial collapse of the government

However, Memphis's sanitary plight remained the city's defining characteristic and most glaring problem in 1878. As the city grew and the population increased, especially in the poor black and immigrant communities of the city, Memphis encountered mounting sanitary di"culties and ultimately degenerated into an environment of filth. !e city's cheap Nicholson street pavement, a network of cypress wood blocks and pitch completed only a decade earlier, was already "decaying and sending forth a poison that none in the city limits could avoid." Furthermore, Memphis had no sanitary regulations on building construction, so "the cellars of the houses in the leading thoroughfares . . . manufactured noxious gases which stole out and made the night air an almost killing poison." Since no public service existed for the

gave o# the inescapable stench of the animal carcasses and human waste that filled its waters.

Of the sanitary woes a$icting Memphis on the eve of the 1878 epidemic, the city's lack of e#ective sewage and water systems o#ered the most flagrant indictment of Memphis's experience with public health. With regards to sewage, Memphis in 1878 had only four-and-a-half miles of privately-owned sewers, which served the a$uent commercial areas of the city; most Memphians instead used outdoor privies, with underground vaults attached for the collection of waste. !e contents of these vaults were either emptied into the Bayou Gayoso or left to saturate the soil until it "was reeking with the o#al and excreta of ten thousand families."

Company to pursue filtration. !erefore, Memphis remained burdened by its sanitary plight as it entered 1878, with the lack of an e#ective sewage system or a source of pure water contributing most greatly to the city's dire conditions.

Unsurprising in light of its sanitary state, Memphis repeatedly su#ered from epidemic disease, witnessing outbreaks of yellow fever, cholera, smallpox, and malaria, and in the process the city earned a national reputation as a city of disease and filth. However, city leaders remained inattentive to the urgent need for public health improvements. In addition to being saddled with debt, the Memphis government placed commercial ambitions ahead of sanitary concerns, fearing that strict quarantine practices or sanitary

in the city. Under the proposed quarantine, Memphis health o"cials would inspect all ships arriving at the city's port. If the inspector suspected yellow fever on board, or if the ship

opposed the quarantine as a financial and commercial hindrance that would accomplish little. Interpreting the counter-petition as evidence that the medical community did not support quarantine, the General Council voted against enacting a quarantine program in early July. Frustrated by this further inaction of the city government to protect the city from disease and the betrayal of his fellow board-members in

at Whitehaven, and one on the Mississippi River at President's Island, just south of the city.

With the news of yellow fever in New Orleans and the enacting of quarantine, public concern over yellow fever

neither arrive nor depart." Even those few businesses that remained open, such as the banks, telegraph o"ce, post o"ce, and the newspapers, could only do so on a limited basis; furthermore, these businesses su#ered heavily as yellow fever decimated their ranks. With 3,000 reported cases by the end of August, "an appalling gloom hung over the city." !e detonation of gunpowder and the burning of tar barrels, both e#orts by the Board of Health to clear the atmosphere of the yellow fever germ, clouded the city in haze, further adding to the pall. Sick and healthy alike remained cloistered in their homes, afraid to venture into the streets and expose themselves to the dreaded fever. Memphis's streets remained deserted, with the movement of relief workers and the transport of the dead o#ering rare glimpses of human activity.

As citizens looked for care and relief in the struggle against yellow fever, the city's public institutions o#ered little respite. Valuing their own survival above their duty to the city, many city councilmen and aldermen joined the flood of residents attempting to escape Memphis. Since the city's

the disease. !e local fire department su#ered from similar desertion and a$iction: at one point, just seven men remained healthy enough to fulfill their responsibilities.

For its part, the Board of Health lacked the authority and

attempted more drastic measures, like using the smoke from exploding gunpowder and burning tar to clear the atmosphere of yellow fever germs. However, all of these e#orts ultimately proved ine#ectual, and the Board of Health provided little abatement to the continued spread of yellow fever through the city. Decimated by the epidemicÕs devastation, both the city government and the Board of Health proved unable to mount an e#ective response, and citizens were left to fend for themselves.

!e CitizensÕ Relief Committee and the Howards: Memphians Respond

the sick and needy of Memphis and maintaining law and order.

At the time of the CRC's creation, Memphis seemed to be at the brink of lawlessness. "With the police and fire departments reduced to a mere handful, it would not have been di"cult for those so inclined to have pushed on to the consummation of the vilest purposes." Attentive to the threat of looting and theft, the Committee supplanted the police force with thirteen new recruits and established a curfew of nine p.m., directing o"cers to arrest anyone not engaged in relief work. Furthermore, two military companies, the Blu# City Grays and the Chickasaw Guards, encamped in the city, with additional militias remaining on reserve. According to Keating, the installation of these companies and the shooting of a "ru"anly" man who harassed the commissary department succeeded in demonstrating the resolve of the CRC to provide law and order. By maintaining public order for the course of the epidemic, the CRC not only allowed the Howards and other relief workers to provide care without fear for their own security, but also, in Keating's judgment, averted "the destruction, perhaps, of the city."

Beyond the duty of preserving order, the Citizens' Relief Committee o#ered an extensive program of aid to the needy citizens of Memphis. In conjunction with the Board of Health, the CRC established refugee camps, located beyond

40,000 rations, allowing for the formation of Camp Joe Williams on August 15 on the Missouri and Tennessee Railroad line at a point four-and-a-half miles south of the city. !e CRC also oversaw smaller camps nearby and north of Memphis. !ese camps ran according to a flexible military discipline, with members from two Army companies, the Blu# City Grays and the McClellan Guards, occupying the southern camps. !ese companies enforced sanitary

!erefore, on September 6 the Board of Health enlisted the CRC to assume the duty of burying the dead. Since many victims were not found until they had reached an advanced stage of decomposition, the CRC also established a burial corps to locate unburied bodies throughout the city. In providing relief to the living, the CRC's commissary occupied the void left by the closure of stores, providing food and supplies to the public. Over the course of the epidemic, the commissary supplied 745,735 units of rations, including 290,303 pounds of bacon, 32,858 pounds of co#ee, and 1,046 barrels of potatoes. In allocating rations of food and clothing, the Committee utilized a system of vouchers distributed to the needy by ward committees, an orderly practice that presented each citizen with his fair share while avoiding favoritism or waste. !roughout all its activities, the CRC displayed a sense of munificence and compassion, relying on donations alone to provide relief and continuing its work despite the deaths of all but seven of its original thirty-two members, including President Fisher. !e Citizens' Relief Committee's assumption of the role of government not only o#ered relief and security to citizens, it gave the entire city "courage by its constant, undeviating course" during the ordeals of the epidemic.

While the Citizens' Relief Committee acted as a provisional government o#ering protection and public relief to Memphis during the epidemic, the Howard Association assumed responsibility for medical care. In the first weeks of

medical care due to the scarcity of available physicians, the

yellow fever seemed undeniable, though it would later be disproven by the discovery of the mosquito vector, and citizens demanded an end Memphis's public health crisis. Only days after the first announced case of yellow fever, the *Memphis Daily Appeal* cried out for "relief from ignorance and incompetency in government, the cormorant greed of city and foreign creditors, and the visitations of a disease from which we ought to be, and would with proper sanitary regulations be exempt. We must make a change," the editors insisted. Now aware of the devastation induced by inaction, city authorities could no longer evade the pressing issue of health and sanitation. !

Health (NBH), a new organization created in 1879 as a direct response to the yellow fever epidemic of 1878. Since the Taxing District lacked the finances to undertake widespread sanitary changes, the local board petitioned the NBH, which was designed to assist local and state boards in producing e#ective quarantine and sanitary measures, and received both counsel and financial assistance.

Local merchants and cotton traders, who believed that public health reform would bolster the economy, sought to assist health o"cials by creating the Auxiliary Sanitary Association (ASA) in May 1879. Organized at a meeting of the Cotton Exchange and the Chamber of Commerce, the ASA proposed to "assist local authorities in the improvement of the sanitary condition of the city," including educating the public on the importance of sanitation and hygiene. Besides purchasing disinfectants, garbage carts, and mules for the Board of Health, the group resorted to public shaming, publishing a list of landowners whose properties remained unsanitary. G.B. !ornton, the new president of the Board

begun to rectify its sanitary plight, but the city had only taken its first steps on its long path of public health reform.

Just as Memphis had begun to address its sanitary failings, the city was beset by another visitation from yellow fever in the summer of 1879. Following the pattern of the previous year, the announcement of the city's first o"cial death on July 9 precipitated the flight of many Memphians. However, local authorities, battle-tested by the previous epidemic and its aftermath, o#ered a more organized resistance. On July 11, the Tennessee Board of Health enacted quarantine for the city and appointed local physicians to serve as inspectors on the railway lines. Moreover, national, state, and local health o"cials met in August and assigned separate duties for the epidemic: the State Board of Health controlled quarantine and disinfection, local o"cials led garbage collection and street cleaning, and the NBH provided advisory support and financial funding. !rough these coordinated steps, as well as the establishment of seven camps outside the city, health o"cials displayed both order and urgency in taking appropriate measures to combat the epidemic.

Aware of the failure of quarantine in 1878, the superintendent of quarantine John Johnson established strict protocols to isolate Memphis, organizing guards to patrol the

ears. In an about-face from previous years, health o"cials at the local and state level refused to place the public health at risk for the commercial gain of the cotton trade. Expressing a view held by most citizens, Board of Health President G.B. !ornton asserted Memphis could “better a#ord to give up the commerce of the whole country south of it for three or four months of the year . . . than be again subjected to a visitation of yellow fever.” !ough the 1879 epidemic would

“considerably less than one-third were su"ciently remote

also recognized the need for an expansion of the garbage force and the replacement of Nicholson pavement with more durable paving. !e survey also called for the destruction or wholesale renovation of unsanitary houses and the ventilation of all houses, including their basements and cellars, so as to remove any infected matter. To enforce these standards in the future, Memphis would require a new system of building regulations, mandating that new construction be approved by health authorities and subject to future inspections. Unfortunately, the survey could not o#er Memphis a definitive solution to its water question, since neither the Wolf River nor the Mississippi River seemed to present viable sources of abundant, pure water. However, the survey did

purposes at the behest of the Board. !e expanded sanitary police corps allowed the Board of Health to direct thousands

blocks and repaved the streets with more durable stone and gravel. By 1886, Memphis had removed 9 miles of Nicholson pavement and laid 22.5 miles of stone paving. With the adoption of granite pavement in the late 1880s for its increased durability, the city paved some 50 miles of streets by the early 1890s. Of course, these paving upgrades occurred unevenly, arriving first in the commercial and a$

Park, to perform an examination of the city with the goal of organizing a plan for a sewer system. On November 26, 1879, the NBH released its preliminary report on Memphis's sanitary conditions and recommended the adoption of the Waring system, which envisioned separate systems for sewage waste and drainage. Although the proposed design had never been implemented on such a large scale, the economy of the Waring system persuaded the impoverished Taxing District, which recognized the immediate need for improved drainage and sewers, to petition the state legislature for funding. Similarly convinced by the NBH's recommendations, a special session of the Tennessee legislature authorized the Taxing District to collect a two percent tax to finance the new sewer project, which then began on January 21, 1880.

In Waring's plans, each street contained 6-inch pipes and a 112-gallon flush tank, designed to clear the line daily to prevent blockages from the accumulation of waste. As workers laid these pipes, the Board of Health ordered the

which surface drainage entered underground pipes that

contaminated the water supply.

surprise at “the unusual purity of the water,” which contained no organic debris and little sediment. !e sandy aquifer that held the water sat beneath a thick layer of firm clay, preventing any surface pollution from contaminating the water. !erefore, Smart wholeheartedly endorsed the artesian well water as a wholesome supply for Memphis, stating that “a plentiful supply of water like this would be a god-send to any city.” After a study confirmed that the underground source held more than enough water to sustain Memphis’s needs, in July the city contracted the newly formed Artesian Water Company to provide the municipal water supply. Graves

Board of Health and pursing numerous sanitation

reform, again through its sewage system and artesian wells.

N F

other Asians) were obviously very di#erent in physical

antagonized relations with the United States. Japanese militarists decided that only a preemptive strike against America's powerful military could ensure a Japanese empire in the Pacific. On December 7, 1941, Japan launched a surprise

one way to exterminate the slant-eyes—with gunpowder!" !e ad includes the image of a Japanese soldier, identifiable as such from his uniform, bearing a sinister grin and exaggerated Asian features (see Figure 2). !e publisher's tone is clear: the

national unity behind the war e#ort. !e way the government

of words could easily have come from a worried US government o"cial serving during the Second World War.

Even if China remained in the Allied camp, many White American politicians feared a Chinese backlash against White racism following the defeat of Japan. !e idea that China would replace Japan as a new, more dangerous “Yellow Peril” struck fear into US government functionaries. Such a development would, in the words of Robert Ward, an American diplomat in China, “commit the world to a racial


sends a Yankee fighter squadron
one-way tickets
planes—trucks—trains

Figure 3.

superiority. President Franklin Roosevelt, speaking in October 1943, summed up the American government's position in a message urging Congress to repeal the Chinese Exclusion Act. He stated, "China is our ally. . . By the repeal of Chinese exclusion law, we can correct a historic mistake and silence the distorted Japanese propaganda."

American lives. !e dangerous foreigner that was the Chinese laborer is transformed by this image into a hero, a partner in

Figure 4.


No, these are not Russian or Polish
war orphans. They are right here
A merchant seaman has been
dragged back to life from

Figure 5.

became models for the American public. Whether or not the Chinese really were models of scrap collecting is unimportant. What matters is that this particular message chose the Chinese to be the example to the Americans, rather than ethnically White allies like the British. Again, the realities of war gave the propagandists no choice. !e Chinese knew all too well the sacrifices necessary to wage war, and their contribution to the war against Japan could not be ignored. No longer could Americans think the Chinese inferior, for they were now comrades-in-arms.

!e harsh reality of war always includes the su#erings of the civilian population, and it was the su#ering of Chinese civilians that had decidedly turned American public opinion against Japan even before the attack on Pearl Harbor. !e horrors of the Rape of Nanking were fresh in the minds of Chinese and Americans alike, and the genocidal nature of Japan's war in China was an excellent vehicle for Allied propaganda. !e atrocities gave America's propagandists a chance to both demonize the Japanese and humanize the Chinese. !e same propagandists were not above guilt-tripping Americans or pulling at their proverbial heartstrings. An appeal from 1943 used many images use(611) -"-20T4 (ar) 6 (ouse

Korean community made even more impressive. By o#ering their meager earnings and, more importantly, their lives to the United States, Koreans succeeded in altering public opinion of their community. !ough a bill in Congress to change Koreans' legal status did not pass (and no changes in Koreans' status would take place until after the Korean War of 1950-1953), in practice public perception did change for the better.

Once again, propaganda advertising reflected the changing reality. White Americans had previously scorned

Figure 6.

was forced into internment camps on the mere suspicion of disloyalty. World War II softened anti-Asian racism in the United States, but it did not kill o# all prejudice.

Still, the Second World War began to change the racial status quo in America. Racism against East Asians had always been based on the "otherness" and "barbarity" of Asian peoples. War brought the shocking reminder that the peoples of China and Korea were not only distinct from the Japanese, but also that they, too, had su#ered from Japanese aggression. Indeed, the peoples of East Asia had su#ered from Japanese brutality far longer than the United States, and now the endurance of the Chinese in particular served as an ample model for the American public. American politicians also

Grave of the Fireflies: V
M J D 1980

Laura Fogarty

!e victims of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II will continue to serve as both a warning and a reminder of the consequences of the Nuclear Age in which we now live. Unfortunately, the trauma of these events has also allowed the world to forget the victims of the firebombing campaigns carried out by the United States against the Japanese mainland during 1942-1945. !ese campaigns resulted in catastrophic damage to Tokyo, Nagoya,

will nevertheless be saddened and even outraged by what is to come. Although *Grave of the Fireflies* has received admiration for its powerful emotional impact, it is not always considered a viable historical source. !

9-10, 1945 with the bombing of Tokyo, resulting in an o"cial death toll of 100,000. Some historians have found

television." !e rise of anime

Napier capitalized on the importance of the 1980s within the Japanese cultural psyche by maintaining that, "during the 1980s it seemed that Japanese society, with its superb bureaucracy, e"ciently functioning government, and high technological expertise existed as a utopian alternative to what many perceived as the corrupt and decadent societies of the West." !e contradiction between Japan's economic success and its bleak cultural outlook indicated that there were undercurrents in the Japanese utopia, which can be traced through the animated releases during the 1980s including the *Barefoot Gen* films and *Grave of the Fireflies* as well as the immensely popular *Akira* in 1988. All of these films are indicative of the negative mental state of the Japanese public during the 1980s due to their focus on either historical or fictional apocalyptic events.

Japan's mental disquiet was partly due to the negative shift in its relationship with America during the mid-1980s. !is shift was preceded by a period of remarkable growth in terms of American admiration and respect for Japan during the 1970s, elicited by the Japanese economic miracle that began to take shape. Over time, the source of admiration also became a source of tension as America began to feel threatened in terms of its economic and international power. !us, Japan's success generated American hostility. !e antagonism was eventually articulated by the "Japan-bashing" phenomenon, which can be defined as "a label and a practice, though there was rarely agreement as to which precise practices it covered, apart from the expression of openly anti-Japanese views, or actual assaults on apparently 'Japanese' people and things." !is practice was directly linked to earlier American resentment, evident during World War II.

!e development of “Japan-bashing” had a profound e#ect on Japan and its people, who responded with anger, hatred, shock, confusion, and most importantly, by closely following and analyzing the evolution of Japan-bashing. In fact, by the 1990s, the term was more prevalent in Japan than in the United States, with only twenty-one percent of Americans being familiar with Japan-bashing in contrast to fifty-four percent of Japanese. Predictably, the Japanese public did not remain complacent in the face of this new aggression. Instead, there were two major responses to Japan-bashing. One was to try and bridge the “perception gap,” which prevented non-Japanese from having a true understanding of Japan.

di"cult working conditions, and the lack of provisions." !e second way was to criticize the military and the government for their aggressive actions, which had put their people at risk.

Both of these methods are shown throughout *Grave of the Fireflies*. Although there is little explicit criticism of the government in the film, it clearly illustrates the desperate condition of the Japanese citizens during the war, which illustrates the government's indisputable failure to protect its people. !e film also makes it clear that Seita is deeply a#ected by the failure of the military. During one scene, for instance, a stranger callously crushes Seita's last hope for salvation by telling him that Japan surrendered unconditionally. !erefore, according to the ideology of victimization, the government and the military were solely responsible for all of Japan's misfortunes.

Japanese victimization, as an ideology, was also deeply linked to the unconditional surrender of Japan and the subsequent American occupation, which forced the Japanese to completely reevaluate their identity. !is process began with a brief period from 1945-1958, which Naoko Shimazu identified as a time of "catharsis" characterized by an "outpouring of autobiographical writings motivated by the desire to expose the evils of militarism." !is period concluded when a reactionary movement ut 1-13ply

the war." !e American occupation, which initially encouraged Japanese distrust and suspicion towards their government and military in order to create a "post-war, peace-loving society," triggered the movement. !e stated intent of these reactionaries was to protect the families of those who died in the war, but it also conveniently brought an end to any discussion or apology for Japanese militancy, which allowed the idea of the Japanese people as the universal victims to take hold during the 1960s.

!e abrupt shift in ideology did not give the Japanese an opportunity to come to terms with their militaristic past. Instead, the American and Japanese governments focused on rebuilding Japan as quickly as possible in order to create a bulwark against communism. To that end, Shimazu believed that both governments reinstated the "pre-1945 apparatus . . . under the new banner of liberal democracy. Not surprisingly, both the state and the elite were none too happy to keep mum and let the public blame the faceless and now symbolically necessary 'militarists' for the evils of the past." !erefore, within the rhetoric of victimization the Japanese people were once again subject to manipulation by their government.

All of these manifestations of Japanese victimization are integral to understanding the overall message of *Grave of the Fireflies*. It is also necessary to examine the first incarnation of *Grave of the Fireflies*, which was a semi-autobiographical novel written by Akiyuki Nosaka about his experiences during the firebombings of 1945. He lost his family in the chaos, and

uphold the victimization mentality and to challenge the Japanese people to accept their responsibility for their actions against their fellow citizens.

In addition, the film illustrates that World War II and its aftermath shook the foundations of Japan's identity. !is is shown by the destruction of the family unit as demonstrated by Seita and Setsuko's mother and father being consumed by the war: the fires generated by the bombing of Kobe burn

initial bombing and dies from her wounds soon after. !us,

W A B N L : A A A , 1948-1955

Samantha Smith

!e post-World War II airline industry experienced a short-lived burst of economic prosperity fueled by civilians eager to embark on planes no longer used solely for military purposes. When the initial “big post-war ticket buying rush” waned, airlines launched advertising campaigns of customer appeal featuring both married and unmarried women. By focusing on the concerns and needs of married women, airlines capitalized on American society’s post-war enthusiasm for

separate spheres: "'Traditional' family [became] the best means to achieve national and personal security." Just as white, a$uent families were most likely to achieve the American dream of a home in the suburbs, so too were they a frequently demographic in airline advertisements. !ese

Figure 1.

advertisements also primarily centered on women, reflecting advertisers' goal to appeal to the position of women as overseers of household finance.

Airline executives "redoubled their e#orts to sell to women" after World War II, reflecting a national trend in

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Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War

!e *Airplane in American Culture*

at his wife as she cheerfully shares, "I'm going with my husband for half-fare!" For middle-class couples with disposable income but a disinclination for extravagance, the text reinforced the financial and emotional benefits of traveling with a spouse. !e woman's location and posture in the advertisement adhered to the convention among airline companies to feature "women as passengers, smiling reassuringly, usually in some contrived position such as mounting the stairs to the aircraft cabin, silk scarf blowing


travel light…
no need to lug along oodles of clothing and diapers.
ON EARTH for traveling
with a baby!"

Figure 2.



Figure 3.

relaxed."

Depicting attractive, well-dressed women, these advertisements tailored for single women the industry's message that air travel was comfortable and desirable. A 1950 American Airlines ad in the *Ladies Home Journal* sported the caption, "I've just taken my first airplane flight and it was wonderful," spoken by a glamorous, smiling woman walking away from a plane with her arms spread wide. A similar ad in !e *New York Times Magazine* encouraged single, female friends to travel internationally; it featured two young women transposed on a flight map of their "'big' time in a short time" trip to London, Paris, Amsterdam, Copenhagen and Stockholm. To entice single women to use its airline, TW

!

from the forty-fourth to the number one United States industry. !e routine sight of female mechanics was spotlighted in the image of the tool-wielding woman featured in American Propeller Corporation's 1943 advertisement praising "unsung, sweating ground crews." In fact, women, many trained and placed in jobs by programs like Women Apprentice Mechanics, constituted thirty-five percent of TWA's employees by 1943. With women benefitting from gender-neutral laws standardizing workdays, wages, and health insurance, a June 1943 article in *Education for Victory* proclaimed "'[t]hat old sign—'Men only' no longer frowns unchallenged at the door of American Aviation.'" However, while women were encouraged to fill wartime positions in male-dominated fields, the post-war relegation of most women to jobs centered on domestic tasks revealed that "the rallying cry of the United States in the cold war was 'freedom,' not 'equality."

In hiring women as stewardesses, airline companies participated in the national postwar reallocation of female workers from industrial jobs, which men returning from war wanted to resume, to service-based jobs. No longer in need of female mechanics,.0 -6 (u1.9 12 0 0 -12 54 33310.5 (to) -50. 0 -1 0 612

Lucy Greenbaum to declare "[t]he courtship of women workers has ended," airline advertisements from 1948 to 1955 nonetheless revealed companies' concerted e#orts to appeal to potential female employees. !e number of airline stewardesses rose by four thousand between 1945 and 1955,

Figure 6.

Each of the advertisements also emphasized the training that accepted applicants would undergo; the 1951 United ad explained that "you fly to Cheyenne, Wyoming, for training at company expense," while a 1953 United ad described the exclusive "girls' school" to train stewardesses. Training was not inconsequential; stewardesses learned "inflight procedure,

Figure 7.

Figure 8.

airline routes and codes, company history and policy . . . stewardess regulations, and geography."

Stewardess training became integral to industry-wide advertising campaigns as yet another reason why airline travel was safe and pleasant. As airline scholar Peter Lyth notes, the 1953 advertisement featuring the pretty stewardess being awarded her wings at her graduation ceremony emphasized the "pride in joining the 'team,' much as a soldier would feel

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Time

United States Women in Aviation

Figure 9.



Figure 10.

!e “youth, vitality, and feminine charm” expected of stewardesses reflected a Hollywood-like allure.

Advertisements for stewardess positions emphasized that the job itself was as “respected and glamorous” as the model employees depicted in the ad campaigns. A United 1952 ad featured a personality named Mary Mainliner, who was

Figure 13.

employed in the industry. !is campaign resonated with those advertisements appealing to single working women.

!e stewardess position a#orded young women autonomy, but the duties of the job essentially elevated traditional expectations for women as domestic workers to a cruising altitude, as evidenced by one advertisement's bold-lettered query "What does a man like for dinner 20,000 feet up?" !is 1951 TWA ad in !e *New Yorker* showed a tray full of food grasped by the red-lacquered fingers of an airline stewardess; the iconography reinforced the custom that women should be the preparers and servers of food. To a potential customer, the advertisement reflected a truth of the industry that meal service was an integral part of a stewardess' duties: "the stewardesses's main task, on the new four-engine planes as much as on the old DC-3s was serving meals." !e focus on food service was another way for airline companies to distinguish themselves from competitors, as United did by advertising that its DC-6 carried 400 pounds of food and that stewardesses served 944 di#erent meals a year. !e fact that stewardesses were surrounded by food on a plane was literalized in TWA's 1953 ad featuring a tray-holding stewardess encircled by the images of turkey, shrimp,

of civilian women to kitchens in the traditional cultural norms that flourished in early 1950s America.

!e thousands of women employed during World War II were met with admiration and respect, but society "a"rmed the primacy of domesticity for women" in post-war culture. !e airline industry sold tickets and secured women to work as stewardesses based on contemporary expectations. Advertisements consistently depicted women, both as passengers and employees, as beautiful, competent, and domestic, attributes expected of housewives and working women alike. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, airline advertisements succeeded in bringing women aloft, but the focus on meals and childcare proved that altitude alone could not liberate women from the domestic sphere.

Figure 14.