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**Published annually by
the Alpha Epsilon Delta Chapter of
Phi Alpha Theta History Honor Society
Rhodes College
Memphis, Tennessee**

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Robert Montagne and **The Berbers** : The Persistence of Myth in French Colonial North Africa

Matthew Moore

Knowledge is not only a means of control and governance for the colonial machine, but it also contains categories by which imaginaries are shaped and colonial relations and attitudes are perpetuated ï [1]

-Adelmajid Hannoum

French colonial North Africa was one of the largest imperial possessions in history. Stretching across the Sahara from the Sea of Sicily to the Atlantic Ocean, at its height in the early 20th century this collection of territories covered approximately 1.5 million square miles. Its successor states currently have a combined population of around 83 million, almost one third of the Arab world. One of the most crucial figures within this massive empire was the anthropologist Robert Montagne. The historian Alice Conklin has •Ž–˜—œ•›Š•Ž•1•'Š•1 Š••1 ž›˜™ŽŠ—1™˜Ž carrying out the work of civilization in their overseas territories; but only in Republican France was this claim

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[1] ‹•Ž•–Š"'•1 Š—FaŨ—ð1

elevated to the realm of ˜••'Œ'Š•1'–™Ž›'Š•฿ance฿•›'– France, more than any other nation, depended on an official ideology to justify and maintain its foreign conquests. This ideology was articulated and developed in part through the

century earlier in the French colony of Algeria. These colonial myths were forged under a system that sought to fully dominate North Africa, turning it into an extension of France itself. In this paper, I will demonstrate that ˜—•Š•—Ž œ1 ˜›"1 Šœ1•ž—•Š–Ž—•Š••¢1œ• old myths of this different colonial regime. Montagne was therefore unable to create a new, progressive vision for ˜›˜ŒŒŠ—1 Ž›‹Ž›œ1'—•Ž™Ž—•Ž—•1•ŽŸ arguing that Montagne unintentionally reproduced Algerian myths. Montagne deliberately drew from the Algerian discourse, accepting and rejecting myths based around their utility for the Moroccan colonial system. Even when he rejected Algerian myths, his replacement formulations still reflected Algerian conceptions. This demonstrates how the persistence of myth within colonial discourse was both a blessing and a curse to colonial leaders like Montagne. Algerian myths retained ideological utility but they also •'–'•Ž•1 ˜—•Š•—Ž œ1 Š‹'•'•¢1 •˜1 •˜›–ž•Š mutually beneficial relationship that he envisioned between France and Moroccan Berber tribes.

Robert Montagne and the Pacification of Morocco

After the establishment of the Moroccan protectorate in 1911, France set out to consolidate control over the entire country. Through this bloody endeavor, euphemistically •Ž›–Ž•1 •'Ž1 ŠŒ'•'ŒŠ•'˜— 1 ˜•1 ˜›˜ŒŒ˜ð extend its dominance outside a core colonial territory that was largely Arab-speaking into the Berber-speaking

hinterlands. France faced considerable difficulty in its attempts to conquer these regions. During the first three years of the Pacification, France sent out annual expeditions against the Middle Atlas Berbers that always ended in failure. In 1914, it began a particularly violent campaign against the Zayan confederation of Berber tribes that dragged on for four years.[4]

France was considerably ignorant of Moroccan Berber groups, and was forced to rely heavily on an understanding of the Berbers that it had developed in its older Algerian colony.[5] In order to better understand and control Moroccan Berber areas, the governor general,o

investigations, some of which were published. With the increased need for ethnographic experts, Lyautey took note of Montagne and personally recruited him into a team of young officers at the *Institut des Hautes Etudes Marocaines.*[11] Montagne provided ethnographic analysis to assist with French military operations against Berbers as the colonial government struggled to establish control. Montagne worked alongside Lyautey and the French military during one of the greatest Berber rebellions against French rule, the Rif War of 1924-1927 in northern Morocco. After the war ended in a French victory, he carried out studies on the Berbers in south Morocco from which he wrote his doctoral thesis in 1930, *Les Berberes et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc.* That same year, he was appointed Director of the Institut Francais in Damascus and in 1931 he wrote his first draft of *The Berbers.*[12] Montagne wrote this work while heavily associated with the colonialist regime. He had deep colonial sympathies and owed all of his personal success to the colonial government. Montagne would revise his work later in 1947, editing it and adding a new conclusion.[13] Despite crucial historical developments during this period, Montagne still echoed the colonialist understanding of

˜ › ˜ Œ Œ ˜ œ 1 • ž • ž › Ž ï

Montagne: Steadfast Colonialist

The last of the traditional Berber tribal resistance groups

Š œ 1 • Ž • Ž Š • Ž • 1 ' — 1 W _ Y Z ð 1 Š — • 1 • ' Ž 1   ™ Š Œ '

complete.[14] However, new forms of resistance began to emerge. An attempt to formalize a separate legal status for Berbers through a royal Dahir, or decree, in 1930 was met with great resistance by many Moroccans.[15] The French were forced to reduce this divide and rule strategy in Morocco. World War II was even more disruptive to French rule, as the turmoil of the French government emboldened Moroccan resistance groups.[16] In 1944, nationalists drafte-9epE(An)

Patricia Lorcin demonstrates that the French understanding of Algeria and the Maghreb was largely crafted by educated members of the military without a professional background in ethnographic analysis. During the first phases of the colony, Algeria was ruled by a military regime and this

'•'•Š›¢1•˜Œ•˜›œ 1œ•ž•'Žœ1˜•1—Š•'Ÿ
•'Ž⧸1'—•˜1•'Ž1•'œŒ˜ž›œŽï1 ˜›Œ'—1œ•Š•
1^Ž⧸ œó1• ˜1•›Ž—•œ1'Š•1‹ŽŽ—1Žœ•Š‹•'œ
members of the medical corps into essentially nonmedical
terrain. The first was the creation of official and personal
relationships leading to active involvements in colonial
politics and society. The second was a pattern of research,
often statistical in nature and motivated by the need for
›ŽŒ˜——Š'œœŠ—ŒŽ1•'Š•1Ž¡•Ž—•Ž•1²⁶Ž¢˜—
Through their investigations of non-medical aspects of
society, doctors and medical agencies classified and divided
Algerian ethnic groups and established a hierarchical
Œ˜—ŒŽ™•'˜—1˜•1•'„€— A # N ˜—ŒŽ™'1••›'

16

with their own expertise.[29]   Lorcin states that intellectual
'—šž'›'Žœ1'—•˜1 ••Ž›'Š1 ™›˜Ÿ'Ž•1•‘Ž1–
essentially French intellectual space in a foreign lan•ï[30] The
circumstances of conquest meant that that this intellectual
space was founded on the ideological sympathies of the
original myth-makers. These images and categories would
endure and dominate conceptions of the Maghreb, whether
or not the same ideological sympathies dominated. Thus the
immediate conditions of the Algerian conquest had lasting
significance.

Myths Accepted by Montagne : The Civilizing Mission

        The civilizing mission of France, *la Mission
Civilisatrice,* was probably the most crucial component of the
Algerian colonial discourse. This myth functioned as the
core logical argument justifying the French presence in
Algeria. The myth first claimed that Algerian society was
inherently backwards and inferior and then that France had
an obligation and right to facilitate progress, often through
violence. The members of the French military that helped
forge this founding myth justified both components of the
argument with their observations and expertise. Patricia
˜›Œ'—1œ•Š•Žœ1•Š'Ž11'œ•••Ž›Žœ˜1žšŽ1 ™˜™žž

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[29] PDWULFLD /RUFLQ ³5RPH DQG)UDQFH
&RORQLDO $OJHUH French Historical Studies vol. 25
no. 2 (spring 2002): 327.
[30] /RUFLQ ³,PSHULDOLVP &RORQLDO ,GH
670.

comprehen

fanaticism, Montagne supported the idea that violence is the best tool to counter Berber societal atomization with his own interpretation of a trend in Berber society. He observed that local leaders periodically emerged and violently attempted to establish a centralized government. Montagne identified Abd El Krim, the leader of the Berber resistance in the Rif War, as one of the quintessential examples of this type of leader. [43]

A more effective use of violence, then, was all that was necessary to establish enduring change. Montagne stated •'Š•1 •''œ1 ™Š•Œ' ˜›"1 ˜•1 •˜›–Ž›1 œ•Š• the subject tribes reveals itself, when tried, to be a poor material from which to construct a Muslim state. A system foreign to the oriental world is required if a lasting empire is to be built in the Maghreb--- one like that of Rome, or else like the one that we brought to Algiers a century ago with the fleet of Charles the Tenth, when we arrived in North •›'ŒŠ i Montagne explicitly referenced the Algerian colonial system as a model for the imposition of French rule among the Moroccan Berbers. This would halt a pattern of chaos and belligerence.

˜—•Š•—Ž œ1›Ž•Ž›Ž—ŒŽ1 ˜•1 was also1 Š œ significant. It drew

relate to Arab sources. Over time, this Latin connection evolved into an ideological cornerstone of the French occupation. Rome became a cultural idiom for French

non-European societies could illuminate the European past through living parallel.[51] The historical and archaeological theories of prominent Metropolitan historians supported the *Mission Civilisatrice* abroad. These connections to an

› Ž Š Œ ' Ž • 1 • ' Ž 1 œ • Š • Ž 1 ˜ • 1 • Ž Ÿ Ž • ˜ ™ – Ž — • 1 Š • • Š ' — Ž

period. Thus the various Berber regions offer a wonderful field of research for sociologists and ethnographers. Here, better than in our own civilization, agitated and overwhelmed by unceasing progress as it is, we may grasp the interplay of the multiple forces acting upon the lives of men, which push them slowly, without their being aware of it, towards ends that they would not recognize, and which lead them to found cities and states at the cost of infinite effort and of conflicts without number. From the peaks of the Atlas Mountains we may also meditate upon a past that books cannot describe and which must have been somewhat like our own prehistory.[55]

In this poetic description of B

œ ˜ Œ ' Ž • ¢ 1 Š › ˜ ž — • 1   ' ' Œ ' 1 • ˜ 1 ‹ ž [58] France and thus • ' ˜ —
had not invaded a nation, but a territory. As with other
founding myths, the conception of ethnic diversity evolved
out of intellectual endeavors to comprehend Algerian
œ ˜ Œ ' Ž • ¢ ï 1   ˜ › 1   Ž ¡ Š – ™ • Ž ð 1   ˜ › Œ ' — 1   œ • Š
™ › Š Œ • ' • ' ˜ — Ž › œ held a tradition of preparing
comprehensive reports processing large quantities of
information, often by means of numerical analysis. This led
them to look beyond the confines of medical analysis in an
attempt to discern the character1 36 381.8[y19(c)4 25attf ssto-3(n)-1

27

to1cl3( )v 36vd   Al-1-29e-5(n)v   f Al-1-29eerian

established distinctions by noting the unique Berber reliance on Marabouts, the descendants of saints, in religious life.[63]

    In his work, Montagne appropriated elements of the

distinguished the Berbers greatly from their Arab
neighbors.

Berber-Arab dichotomy functioned to support and inform a specific divide and rule policy of the French colonial regime.

French colonial policy in Morocco relied heavily on a dualistic compartmentalization of Moroccan society. Before the Entente Cordiale of 1904, which placed Morocco firmly in the French sphere of influence, French orientalists such as Doutté had a much more nuanced and flexible understanding of Morocco. However, as France became increasingly involved in Moroccan affairs, French thinkers developed a crystallized and dogmatic discourse.[72] French administrators divided Moroccan society firmly between areas within the control of the Moroccan State, the *Bled el-Makhzan,* and the supposedly chaotic and violent areas outside of its control, the *Bled es-Siba.* This distinction was later connected to an ethnological discourse that connected these categories with Arabs and Berbers, similarly opposed to one another. Edmu0 0 1 36 (h)-7 1 36 414sketyts(r)-,4at connecte

policy specific to Berber areas.[75] This new Berber policy stressed the distinctions of the vulgate further, supporting divergent political regimes in the two areas. This strategy was first implemented when the French found that the Beni Mtir tribe would accept a peace treaty that called for them to submit to French state instead of Sultan.[76]

The Moroccan Vulgate, under attack, needed an ideological defender. One year later Montagne wrote *The Berbers,* justifying and informing the Moroccan Vulgate with his categories of distinction.   Š — — ˜ ž – 1 Š › • ž Ž œ 1 • ' Š • 1 ˜ conception of the Berber- › Š ‹ 1 • ' Œ ' ˜ • ˜ – ¢ 1 ' — œ ™ ' › Ž • Ž › ‹ Ž › 1 ™ ⁸⁰• This assessment probably gives Montagne too much credit, especially since the strategies of the Moroccan Vulgate were implemented years before he even entered Morocco. However, it does highlight that Mon • Š • — Ž œ 1 • ' œ Œ ˜ ž › œ Ž 1 — ˜ • 1 ˜ — • ¢ 1 œ ž ™ ™ but informed and helped determine colonial policy. Montagne appropriated a myth of ethnic diversity forged in Algeria to argue against the presence of a nationforged

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subordinated to French oversight through indirect rule. This would allow native society to develop on its own. Unlike the Moroccan Vulgate, which was more specific to the Moroccan situation, Associationism was part of a global debate within •'Ž1 Œ˜•˜—'Š•1 •'œŒ˜ž›œŽ1 ˜—1 ›Š—ŒŽ colonial possessions. The two sides of this debate were the assimilationists, who wanted to transform colonies into miniatures of France, and the associationists, who sought to preserve and maintain existing cultures in colonial territories.[81] Š¢–˜—•1 Ž••œ1œ•Š•Žœ1•'Š•1 œ Œ˜—œ'•Ž›Ž•1•'Ž1•›Š•'•'˜—Š•1Œ˜•˜—'Š•1• meant that the colony was to become an integral, if noncontiguous, part of the mother country, with its society and population made over / to whatever extent possible / in 'Ž›1'–Š Ž.[82] Assimilation was the dominant theory during the early stages of the French colonial empire and the establishment of the Algerian colony. Algeria was the quintessential assimilationist colony and was considered an integral part of France by 1848. Assimilationism remained widely unchallenged until around the turn of the century.[83] Morocco became a stage for this great debate and a platform for associationism. The most important leader of the Moroccan colony, Lyautey, was a committed associationist and he sought to show through practice that a policy that

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[81] Eilzabeth Ezra, *The Colonial Unconscious: Race and Culture in Interwar France* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 4.

[82] Raymond Betts, *Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Theory: 1890-1914* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 8.

[83] Ibid., 9.

has been allowed to a degree quite unusual in French Œ˜•˜—'Š•1 [88] This shows how well received Lyautey was by contemporary scholars. In 1931, the same year that *The Berbers* was written, Lyautey organized a grand colonial exhibition in Paris that stressed the cultural distinctiveness ˜•1 ›Š—ŒŽ œ1 Œ˜•˜—'Š•1 ™˜œœŽœœ'˜– associationist system.[89]

The Algerian discourse built upon the myth of ethnic diversity and the Arab-Berber dichotomy to argue that the Kabyle Berber ethnic group, already established as the Berber archetype, were superior to Arabs and more similar to the French ideal. This myth postulated that Kabyles were Š1 œŽ•Ž—•Š›'£Ž•1–˜ž—•Š'—1™Ž˜™•Žð1•' ˜›•Œ1'—1˜›'•'•'—1Š—•1˜—•¢1œ[90] ascribing Œ'Š positive qualities to the Kabyles that privileged them over Berbers and linked them with France. It built upon the

volatile, less I œ • Š – ' £ Ž • ð 1 œ Ž • Ž⁹²— •Š cl¢a 1 i nš aŒ Ž ï emerged that privileged Berbers over Arabs and questioned the role of Islam in Berber society.

In keeping with Associationism Montagne accepted the centrality of Islam to Berbers, rejecting the Kabylia – ¢ • ' œ ﬞ Šﬞ et hat Berbers were only superficial Muslims. He stated • ' Š • 1 › Š — Œ Ž 1 ' Š • 1 — ˜ 1 — Ž Ž • 1 • ˜ 1 Islamization of the Berbers for the simple reason that the Berbers had been Islamized centuries ago. Their devotion to their faith is often even more noticeable than that of the Arabs. And they would certainly be astonished if they heard, from the fastneften1 241.9o9(o)-3(f)-96(t)-3(h)-7(ei)10(r)-4( )-o9(mou

with a conception that Berber religious life is Islamic but distinct.

Montagne rejected •'Ž1 Š‹¢•'Š1 −¢•' œ1 ''Ž› understanding of Berbers and Arabs. His distinctions between the two did not explicitly privilege Berbers over Arabs. Rather, Montagne adopted a more nuanced view that the groups had divergent strengths and weaknesses. After disparaging B

groups. The two ethnicities had strengths and weaknesses, but these did not overlap.

The Kabylia myth in Algeria connected Berber superiority with the idea that they were uniquely Š œ œ ' – ' • Š ‹ • Ž ï 1 • • ' 1 œ ž – – Š › ' £ Ž œ 1 • ' ' œ 1 Ÿ ' Ž been in contact with Roman civilization, traces of which might be seen in the functioning of their villages, the Kabyles would be predisposed to Western rationality, which would facilitate their assimilation the French nation and perhaps even their conversion to Christianity.[96] 1 — • Ž • • Ž Œ • used qualities that connected the Berbers to the French to argue not only for their superiority to Arabs, but also the potential for assimilation to the French nation. Among • ˜ Œ • ˜ › œ 1 ' Ž › Ž 1 Š œ 1 Š 1 • › ˜ ' — • 1 Œ ˜ — œ Ž — œ between the plain-dwelling Arabs and the mountain-dwelling Kabyles made the latter more suitable for Š œ œ ' – ' Š • ' ˜ — ï

Montagne did not argue for assimilation as a goal for Berber society in Morocco. Rather he supported a hybrid political system, ultimately independent of France, stating that:

> Many Frenchman have thought, for over a century, that it would be easy to assimilate the Berbers, because they were not Arabs; many Arabs have, for twenty years at least, proclaimed the Berbers as their racial brothers, their comrades-in-arms in the struggle against the West because they were Muslims. It is possible that history will prove both these sets of beliefs wrong by producing in North Africa a hybrid political variety: Muslim communities, yet strongly westernized, seeking to achieve a synthesis of the different influences, and placing themselves between civilizations, in an intermediary position, just as they are situated geographically on the shores of the Mediterranean at the interface between Europe and Africa. But for such a development to take place it is necessary, above all, for the old conservative Berber society, as we have described it here, to begin to wither away.[100]

In place of the Alger ' Š — 1 • ' œ Œ ˜ ž › œ assim lation , • 1 ˜ Montagne advised a hybrid system. He constructed a new myth for the course of Berber society, but this myth was still remarkably similar to the old Algerian conception. Montagne believed that traditional Berber society must

' • 'A#« ƒ 'A.©½)a4i(7/F11 1t4i(7/F11 1t4i(7/F11 1t4i(7/F0t4i(s)4(t

all understanding of the colony. The original colonial myths become the basis of further inquiry and their arguments persist over time. Myth builds upon myth. This supports the power of the colonial regime by muzzling any ability to question the colonial narrative. However, it also limits the creative potential within the discourse. The core function of myth is still to inform and support colonial policy. As colonial policy changes, myths must somehow adapt within

always the same and a desire to support the colonialist system warps the analysis of colonial society.

While there is the potential for divergent opinions, colonial discourse fosters the perpetuation of established – ¢ • ' œ 1 • ' › ˜ ž • ' 1 ' • œ 1 Œ ˜ — • › ˜ • 1 ˜ • 1 ' — • Ž • • Ž Œ • ž work demonstrates the perpetuation of colonial knowledge

nationalists as well as a divide and rule policy of the central government that mimics French colonial policy.[103] French colonial myths endure outside of decolonized French •Ž›› ' •˜ › ' Ž œ 1 Š œ 1 Ž••ï 1 Š——˜ž–1 ™˜ ' —•o › ' Ž—•Š•'œ–1 'œ 1 Š•1 • 'Ž 1 ‹ ŠœŽ Ž[104] Therefore 1 ›'. all modern understandings of the Middle East build upon French discourse. Discourse persists in the modern world to justify new systems of power. After the American occupation, neo-conservatives stressed the sectarian nature of Iraqi society to disparage its ability to form a coherent nation without continued U.S. intervention. This vision mirrored the Algerian myth of ethnic diversity crafted for the French colonial system. Both stressed ethnic divisions to question the presence of a nation-state and justify foreign involvement. Decolonization does not mean the end of colonial myth. Montagne repeated Algerian myths when he tried to formulate a new relationship one hundred years after the Algerian conquest. Today, one hundred years after Montagne, we continue to build upon a colonial myth.

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[103] Bruce Maddy- Ž ' •£ – Š — ð 1 ˜ — • Ž œ • Š • 1 • Ž — • • ' Ž œ ñ 1 Ž › ‹ Ž › ' œ ˜ › • 1 • ' Œ Š ð 1

Black Agency: En Masse Mobility and Individual Emancipation

Taylor White

On referendum day, February 22, 1865, Tennessee became the sixth state to enact immediate emancipation at the close of the Civil War, despite the fact that the vast majority of Tennesseans continued to support the institution of slavery.[1] Therefore, far from fading with a whimper, the ʼ — œ•ʼ•ž•ʼ˜—1 ˜•1 œ•ŠŸŽ›¢1 ʼ screaming and œ œ crawling •˜›1 œž›Ÿʼ¥Š•ï Border State, Tennessee —ž–‹Ž›Ž•1 Š–˜•1 ‹›Š‘Š–1 ʼ—Œ˜•—1 œ1 ›˜Œ•Š–Š•ʼ˜— œ1•Ž1Ž¡ŒŽŽ™•ʼ˜—œð1•ŽŠŸŸ who held the smoking gun of emancipation. While self-emancipationist historians focus on the enslaved man, particularly the men who attempted to escape slavery, most black men and women remained at home throughout the Civil War. This is not to say that these slaves did not actively fight for their freedom. The agency of immobile individuals, whose homes defined the institution of slavery in Tennessee,

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[1] John Cimprich, •ŠŸŽ›¢ œ1 —•1ʼ—1 1865, (Tuscaloosa: 1882 The University of Alabama Press, 1985), 116.

[2] Ibid., 4.

There are two dominant narratives about Ž – Š — Œ ' ™ Š • ' ˜ — ñ 1 • ' Ž 1 • › Š • ' • ' ˜ — Š • ð 1 ' — • Ž • self-emancipationist retelling. Historiography traditionally paints Lincoln as the mythic emancipator of the helpless slave, while self-emancipation theories throw Lincoln out

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While escapee narratives attract interest because they are exciting and fit snuggly into the accepted idea of black agency, only three of the total thirty-seven interviews conducted by Egypt fit into this category. Even then, these men and their families enjoyed varying degrees of freedom after enlisting. The remaining thirty-four interviewees did not die enslaved, but fought individually to attain equally real freedoms. To conflate agency with mobility, particularly

master. Reed, a former slave from Hartsville, Tennessee recalled: ' — 1 œ • Š Ÿ Ž › ¢ 1 • ' Ž ¢ 1 ž œ Ž • 1 • ˜ 1 • Ž Š Œ ' 1 had no soul. They said all they needed to do was to obey • ' Ž ' › 1 – ' œ ⁒ › Ž œ œ ï

determination to join the army compelled him to run to Federal lines at least four times by only nineteen years of age.[36] At least sixty years later, this veteran mocked his

˜ — Ž › œ 1 Š • • Ž – ™ • œ 1 • ˜ 1 ” Ž Ž ™ 1 ' ' – 1 œ — a ˜ m 1 • ' • ' ‹
Š — • 1 ' Ž › 1 • ' • • • Ž 1 Œ ' ' • • › Ž — ñ 1   ' Ž ¢ 1   ˜ ž • • —
Ž Ÿ Ž › • Š œ • ' — • 1 ' ' ™ 1 [37] Ž ð 1 – ¢ 1   ˜ › • ï

Assuming a slave overcame these obstacles and escaped, his or her options were limited. Because contrabands camps inspired less retaliatory Confederate aggression then enlisting, they were thought of as a haven for runaways. Just as before the war, males between the ages of sixteen and thirty-five dominated successful escapes.

these contraband camps may have motivated anyone who had a fighting chance of independent survival to do so. In the winter of 1862-63 alone, at least 1,200 deaths were recorded in Memphis and another 1,400 were recorded in Nashville, motivating an estimated two-thirds majority of escaped slaves in these cities to live on their own.[40]

However, these camps also provided otherwise listless families with shelter, food, and as seen in the event of Š " ˜ › 1   Ž — Ž › Š • 1   ˜ ' — 1   ï 1   ˜ ˜ •   œ 1   ˜ — • Ž • Ž › middle Tennessee, a temporary safe haven for those slaves caught in the war zone. Mrs. Moore, a young house slave whose mother worked as a cook, escaped with her mother

Š — ¢ Š ¢ 1 Š ‹ ˜ ž • 1 ý ' Ž 1 Š — • 1 ' ' œ 1 • Š – ' • ¢ œ̈ 1 Œ ˜

When the narrator finally achieved emancipation, his home
was still a pseudo-payment that represented his servitude to

' ' œ 1 – ' œ • Š ž̈ œ ž̈ œ 1 1 • › Ž̈ B ỹ̃ — the end of his life, the

— Š › › Š • ˜ œ 1 › Ž ™ › Ž œ œ Ž • 1 • ' • ' • ' — • 1 œ ™ ' › ' • 1

• ˜ Š › • œ 1 ' ' œ 1 • ˜ • • Š — — 1 • Š • ' Ž › ð̈ -of-a- Š 1̈ • Œ • Š1̈— —

' ˜ 1 ‹ › ˜ ž • ' • 1 ' ' – 1 Š — • 1 ' ' œ 1 • Ž • • ˜ 1 œ • Š Ÿ̃— Ž̈ œ 1 ž̈

If the narrator could have returned to his lost years after the

Š › 1 Š — • 1 ' Š • 1 ý ' ' œ þ 1 Š ¢ 1 ' • 1 • ' Ž – 1 Š • • 1 ý

have is a chopping block and chop every one of their heads

˜ • • 1̈ This narrator and others are not only enraged about
slavery before 1864, but also about how little emancipation
existed in their lives after it.

Other slaves who were slower to leave their homes used
emancipation as an abstract form of power over their

– Š œ • Ž › œ ï 1 — Ž 1 ˜ œ̈ Š̈ • Š ¢ Ž ‹ ˜ 1 1 ' • ' 1 ý ' Ž › þ 1 ' ' • Ž̈

for three ye Š › œ 1 Š • • Ž › 1 • ' Ž 1 ' Ÿ ' • 1 Š › ð 1 Š • • ' ˜ ž •

make me think I wasn't free," used emancipation to make life

' ˜ • 1 • ˜ › 1 • 1̈ Ž Ḧ— d̈ir master could be so cruel that slave

Œ ' ' • • › Ž — 1 ˜ ž • • 1̈ • • Ž — 1 › ž — 1 Š Š ¢ ð 1 1̈ ḧž̈ĕ Š Ÿ ' —

œ " Ž • Ž • ˜ — œ 1 ' Ž › Ž 1 • ' Ž 1 Ÿ Š › – ' — • œ̈ Ÿ̈ Ë— š̈l̈• Ž œ •

the narrator felt that she was safest working in her old home,
protected by the threat of asserting her freedom. When the

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49 Ibid., 82.

60

— Š › › Š • ˜ › 1 • ' • 1 › Ž – ' — • 1 – Š › œ Ž 1 ˜ – 1 • ' Š • 1 œ
as free Š œ 1 • ' Ž 1 ‹ ' › • œ 1 ' — 1 • ' Ž 1 Š ' › ð 1 ' Ž 1 • ' • —
and from then on allowed her the freedom to attend
meetings and to pragmatically quit her servitude.[55]
Another female interviewee, Vergy, gained freedom only
through the dogged efforts of her father. Without his
persistence, her masters would have taken advantage of her
young age to manipulate her into extended servitude for as
long as possible. Vergy and her brother, Dave, œ • Š ¢ Ž • 1 ' • '
• ' Ž 1 œ Š – Ž 1 ' ' • Ž 1 ™ Ž ˜ ™ • Ž 1 • ' • • 1 • ' Ž 1 Š › 1 Œ Ž
because of course we didn't know where to go nor

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consented, and allowed Vergy to rejoin her father and brother.

However, this exchange would prove far from Vergy and

'Ž › 1 •˜ › –Ž › 1 –Š œ • Ž › œ 1 • Š œ • ð 1 Š œ 1 œ 'Ž 1 • › Ž

Ž š ž Š • • ¢ 1 – Š — ' ™ ž • Š • ' Ÿ Ž ⁵⁸ Her owners would look [58] Her owners would

look •˜ — 1 • 'Ž ' › 1 —˜ œ Ž œ 1 Š • 1 Ž › • ¢ œ 1 • ' • Ž 1

even threaten to whip her for praising him. When it would come time for Vergy to leave, her mistress would try to bribe

'Ž › 1 ' • ' 1 • ' • • œ 1 œ 'Ž 1 Œ ˜ ž • • 1 Ž — " ˜ ¢ 1 ' • 1 ý Ž ›

•˜ — • Ž⁵⁹ Vergy would feign ignorance then make her way

‹ Š Œ " 1 ' ˜ – Ž ð 1 Œ ˜ – ' — • 1 ‹ Š Œ " 1 •˜ 1 • 'Ž 1 ' ' • Ž 1

'Ž — 1 œ 'Ž 1 • Ž • • 1 ' • 1 Š œ 1 • ' – Ž 1 œ 'Ž 1 •˜ • 1 ý 'Ž ›

'Ž ›⁶⁰ Although she proved an easy target for free labor in

'Ž › 1 ¢ ˜ ž • ' ð 1 Ž › • ¢ œ 1 Š • Ž — Œ ¢ 1 to make a ¢ 1 Š

new life with her father and brother, but to actively, and apparently easily, manipulate her previous owners.

Other narratives proposed a lifestyle after slavery that was identical to the lifestyle before it, in all but wage. This pseudo-slavery allowed family groups to stay together until they earned enough money to get on their feet as freemen and women. Although most slaves were aware of the war waging around them, many surrounding Murfreesboro

œ • Š ¢ Ž • 1 ˜ — 1 ™ • Š Œ Ž 1 û • ž › ' — • 1 • the fact that ü 1 Œ

Š • • Ž › 1 • › Ž Ž • ˜ – 1 Š œ 1 • Ž Œ • Š › Ž • 1 • 'Ž ¢ 1 ' Š • 1 •˜

interviewee, Mr. Chapman, from Trenton, Tennessee seemed

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⁵⁸ Ibid., 65.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 66.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 68.

to consider service and paid servitude equally admirable. He argued that modes of agency were not tiered, or even totally chose — ð 1 ‹ ž • 1 Œ ' › Œ ž – œ • Š — • ' Š • ï 1 ‘ Š ™ heað — 1 œ ˜ • 1 Œ ˜ • ˜ › Ž • 1 ™ Ž ˜ ™ • Ž 1 ˜ ž • • 1 › ž — 1 Š Š ¢ 1 • ˜ 1 ‹ • ' • — know nothing else but slavery / never thought of nothing else. I just belonged to the man who provided for me and I had to take whatever he g ' Ÿ Ž 1 ⁶¹Ž These seemingly obedient men and women, especially those that wanted to keep their children with them throughout the war, hoped that their continued service would translate into expanded freedoms and opportunities post-emancipation.

Reed, formerly a slave in Hartsville, Tennessee, remained on the Hale plantation with his family throughout the war, waiting to assert his freedom after emancipation gained official legality. However, Reed mentioned that many ˜ • 1 • ' Ž œ Ž 1 Œ ˜ – ™ • Š Œ Ž — ire of the others. Your own the ž • • 1 œ ' • Ž • ' — Ž œ ð 1 Š — • 1 › ž — 1 • ˜ 1 • ' Ž 1 Š — ” Ž Ž œ 1 • ' Ž 1 Š — ” Ž Ž œ 1 ‹ Š Œ ” 1 Š — 1 • Š ” Ž 1 Š • • 1 • ' Ž 1 Œ ˜ While these individual rebellions do not appear in the statistics of runways, enlistments or contraband camps, these stories reveal how the average men and women on the ground accomplished personal independence. These stories show that emancipation was not the result of the former-slave clad in grey, or even the Tennessee election of 1865, but of a process of steady assertion, and steadfast fight that, in

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[61] Ibid., 74.

[62] Ibid., 44.

grabbed the lash with one hand and grabbed a handful of

other man pulled out a gun, catching sight of it, Fannie spat

Less than a week later, Fannie

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freedom.[80]   ' Ž — 1   ˜ • – Ž œ   1 ˜   — Ž › œ 1 • Ž Œ ' • Ž • 1 •
father, Frank, t

actions did not win true emancipation for himself or his family.

Joseph Farley, another black soldier who served behind Confederate lines spent the rest of his life fighting to ensure •'Š•1 'Ž1 ˜ž••1 —ŽŸŽ›1 ‹Ž1 ž—•Ž›1 •'Ž1 ''• [86] Farley relays a wide range of information about the Civil War, from the first shots at Fort Sumter, to white manipulation of black preachers, to the harsh realities of Œ˜—•›Š‹Š—•1 ŒŠ–™œð1 'Ž›Ž1 'Ž1 œŠ'•1 children had to be guarded to keep the Rebels from carrying •'Ž–1 ‹ŠŒ"1 •˜•'Ž1 [87] Farley ran away from life as a slave in Virgin'Š1 ‹ŒŠžœŽ1'Ž1 Š—•Ž•1•˜‹Ž1 only enjoyed temporary independence. Farley travelled through Hopkinsville by killing his horse and spending —'•'•œŽ1'—1•'Ž1 ˜˜•œœð1˜—•¢1•˜1‹Ž1 'Š••Ž [88] the outskirts of Clarksville. Farley recognized these men as rebel soldiers by their grey uniforms, so when asked where 'Ž1 ŠœŽ1•˜'—•1'Ž1œŠ'•ñ1 1 ŠœŽ1•˜'—•1•˜1 army, so they told me to stay right there, that they needed a •'˜žœŠ—•1–Ž—1 [89] Farley does not provide many details of his time in the military, aside from mentioning that ™Š›•1˜•1''œŽ1›Ž••–Ž—•1™Š›•Œ'™Š•Ž1'— Š••'˜ž•'1 'Ž1 Šœ1 [90] He also perpetuated the œ™ŽŒž•Š•'˜—1•'Š•1 Ž—Ž›Š•1 ˜››Šœ•1 ˜››Žœ•1Œ

[86] Ibid.,127.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Ibid., 122.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., 121.

buried colored people Š • ' Ÿ Ž This horrific injustice and the
 Š ¢ 1 œ ˜ – Ž 1 oÿ œ e r Š id not care any more about you
• ' Š — 1 • ' Ž ¢ 1 • ' • 1 • ˜ › 1 • ˜ • œ 1 • ž Ž • Ž • 1 Š › • Ž ¢ 1 œ
   1 — Ž Ÿ Ž › 1 • ' ˜ ž • ' • 1 Š ‹ ˜ ž • 1 • ¢ ' — • ï 1   1 — Ž Ÿ

came out to his gate and greeted the man with two pistols,
•'›Ž 1 ˜—Ž1 '—1 •'Ž1 –Š— œ1 •ŠŒŽ1 Š—•
Š•˜˜œ̈ŽïŠ›•Ž¢ œ1 ›˜Š•1•˜1 Ž–Š—Œ'™̈bũšt•it˜—1 must be noted that to achieve this violent definition of freedom Farley was forced to leave behind a life with people he does not name.

Whether in the home, in the army, or from within contraband camps, ex-slaves in Tennessee needed extraordinary determination to face their individual uphill battles for emancipation. The Tennessee government during and post war, enacted emancipation as an empty political
–˜ŸŽ1 '—•Ž—•Ž•1 •˜1 •Ž•ŽŠ•1 •'Ž1 —'˜—'̇ Conservatives and the secessionists, not the injustices of slavery.[97] Therefore, uniform policy did not represent uniform beliefs or intentions. Only a small minority of Tennessee whites voluntarily released their slaves under the stress of war, while the majority fought all the harder to preserve it.[98] Therefore, each interviewee described a unique journey to freedom in spite of a dogged common enemy / racism. On referendum day, February 22nd ð1 Ž——Žœœ party politics reduced emancipation to a weapon yielded by whites, for whites, meaning that the average Tennessean did
—˜•1œŽŽ1 •'Ž'›1Ÿ'Ž œ1˜•1œ•ŠŸŽ›¢1›̌ŽŒŠ

Empirical evidence can serve as a necessary backbone to tie together scattered narratives, but black emancipation in the popular American imagination proves that the overarching approach can cut out the human voice, and with it, the truth. To understand the impossibility of immediate emancipation, historians must turn their ears back to the black individual. Only by acknowledging the nuanced, extraordinarily disadvantaged condition of former slaves, can one begin to imagine the ephemeral nature of emancipation. For any equality to exist on the ground, in their homes, or in their lives at all, slaves needed to win their freedom on a highly individual basis by slowly recasting perceptions of slaves and their emancipation owner by owner.

clerics present swore upon the Koran never to reveal the location.

As the world watched the demonstrations of the Arab Spring that shook Libya in 2011 and as the various reports of state repression came to t

systematically excluded the native Libyans from any sort of administrative role. Instead, the colonizers chose to import • ' Ž ' › 1 • Ž Š • Ž › œ ' ' ™ 1 • › ˜ – 1 • Š • ¢ ï 1 • Š • ¢ œ 1 Œ never succeeded in gaining complete control of the territory. Hence, autonomous governments based around the old Ottoman administration structures rose up throughout the countryside. In 1912, the Ottoman Empire signed a peace treaty with opposing European powers (which included Italy) to end the Balkan War. The treaty mandated that the Ottomans leave Libya, but it granted the local Libyan Arabs Š • – ' — ' œ • › Š • ' Ÿ Ž 1 Š ž • ˜ — ˜ – ¢ 1 ' — 1 › ž • ' — • ï 1 ˜ of the Ottoman administrators were native Libyans so they had no reason leave their country.

As Europe erupted into World War I, Italy was forced to focus its efforts away from its Libyan colony. By 1918, as Italian resources in its colony had worn thin, the native Libyans enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. When Italy began to refocus its resources on its colonial endeavor, it discovered that the Libyans were executing a high degree of autonomy through their tribal structure, and they demanded that the local tribal leaders to relinquish power and disarm. When they refused, the Italians were faced with two options, to either withdraw or to take military action. The latter option was chosen.

This military action became essentially a new conquest, and was known in Italy as the *riconquista,* and pitted a modern well-armed nation against groups of tribal people. This process lasted from 1923-1932 and resulted in

the massacre of thousands of Libyans with many of the

with the British, he guaranteed Libyan autonomy following the war.[6] In 1951, under a hastily made international agreement facilitated by the then newly formed United Nations, Idris was given control of the Libyan monarchy, assuming the title of king.

Under the Idris monarchy Libya had extremely close relations with Western countries. During the rule of the monarchy from 1951 to 1969, the United States and Britain maintained military bases within the country. These bases employed 125,000 Libyans both directly and in related services. In addition to the military bases, British and American oil companies had a strong hold on the large oil

government and the constantly encroaching British into Egyptian affairs. Furthermore, the first war that the Egyptian Army had fought in sixty-five years, the Arab Israeli War of 1948, had been a devastating loss and many of these officers believed that the Egyptian administration was to blame. When Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956 he sought to spread the seed of pan- Arab unity and export the ideals of his revolution throughout the entire Arabic speaking world.[9]

An Ideology is Born

Š • • Š • ’ œ 1 ž ™ ‹ › ’ — • ’ — • 1 Š — • 1 • ‘ Ž 1 • ˜ › ideology were defined by the corruption and nepotism of the Idris monarchy juxtaposed with the doctrines of the Egyptian revolution occurring next door. The exact year and • Š • Ž 1 ˜ • 1 Š • • Š • ’ œ 1 ‹ ’ › • ‘ 1 ’ œ 1 ž — ” — ˜ — 1 ‹ between 1940 and 1943. Born to a poor, illiterate Bedouin family of a lesser tribe near Sirte, Qaddafi was the first member of his family to ever learn to read and write.[10] He had a strong Islamic upbringing as his religious teachers taught him stories of tribal heroes alongside the stories of ˜ › Š — 1 ’ — 1 Ž Ž ” • ¢ 1 • Ž œ œ ˜ — œ ï 1 ž › ’ — • 1 secondary school, the ideals of Nasser and his Arab identity began to take root in him and his classmates. In fact, it was said that Qaddafi grew up with the Cairo based Pan .Arab

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[9] Panayiotis Vatikiotis, *The History of Modern Egypt* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 376-379.
[10] David Blundy, *Qaddafi and the Libyan Revolution* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1987), 39.

all times as it blasted Western imperialism and the presence of foreign bases on Libyan soil.[11] Qaddafi saw Nasser as his mentor and sought to emulate him, especially in his younger years.[12] *Philosophy of the Revolution* was the most important book for the young Qaddafi. He read and re-read this short sensational book the Egyptian government and ensuing revolution. This book contained the

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informed his fellow conspirators the time and date he planned to launch it. The coup was essentially bloodless except one life lost and a few wounded defending the Cyrenaica Defense force in Gurnada. Qaddafi sent one conspirator to inform the radio station in Benghazi of the coup as he and his other confidants prepared to rush the military barracks and to arrest the Crown Prince in his palace. The following day, as Qaddafi and his conspirators discussed the coup in a television chat, their demeanor œ Ž Ž – Ž • 1 Ž ¡ ž ‹ Ž › Š — • 1 Š — • 1 • ' Ÿ Ž • ¢ ð 1 Ž Š Œ ' 1 stories of the coup, like college students discussing a prank. These recent graduates of the military academy all came from lower to middle class backgrounds and were of less prestigious tribes. They represented a clear break from the rich and elitist previous administration and were highly populist with their revolutionary rhetoric.[14] From the beginning, Qaddafi assumed control of the RCC and it would serve as the states only legislative and executive body during the first few years.[15] While the RCC officers possessed charismatic appeal and rhetoric, they possessed little programmatic clarity. In an attempt to mobilize the masses of Libyan society the RCC formed the Arab Socialist — ' ˜ — 1 û   ü ð 1 ' ' Œ ' ð 1 • ˜ • • ˜ ' — • 1 Š œ œ Ž › œ serve as a vanguard party for the government. However, the ASU failed to mobilize the masses and after four years of

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[14] Lillian Craig Harris, ' ‹ ¢ Š ñ 1 Š • • Š • ' œ 1 Ž Ÿ ˜ • ž • ' ˜ — 1 (Boulder: ‹ 1 ˜ • Ž 1 • Ž Westview Press, 1986), 46.

[15] Mohamed A. El- ' Š Š œ ð 1   ' Ž 1 Ž 1 ˜ Œ ' Ž • ¢ 1 ' — 1 Š • • Š • ' œ 1 ' ‹ Š — • ž › Ž *Africa Today*, 31. 3 (1984): 17.

stocktaking, in 1973 the RCC was ready to implement a revolution.[16]

˜•'•'Œ Š•'˜— 1 ˜•1   '' › •1 —'Ÿ Ž › œ Š•1 'Ž ˜ › ¢ 1

Initially following the coup in 1969 the RCC began a process of nationalizing the economy, forcing the British and American companies and military bases out of the country, and removing all remnants of the monarchy from the government. However, in 1973 the government set out to
'– ™•Ž–Ž—•1 Š••Š•' œ1   '' › •1 —'Ÿ Ž › œ Š•1
to serve as an alternative to capitalism and Marxism. The theory showed a disdain for political parties and bureaucracy and had dramatic social, economic, and
™˜•'•'ŒŠ•1 '—'•'Š•'Ÿ Žœï1 'Ž 1 ž••'– Š•Ž 1 •˜Š
'Ž ˜ › ¢ 1 Šœ 1•˜ 1Œ › Ž Š•Ž 1 Šm hairïŠ/aï Ztha tEvŠ s•Ž•1 a nation directly governed by its citizens with no intermediaries.[18] The theory has been astutely described as a
™ ˜•'•'Œ Š•1 ¹⁹ Ž•'•'˜— ï

Rifts between the leadership of the RCC began to form as the revolution moved forward. On one side, some wanted a course of action with more clarity and a carefully designed economic plan, while the other side, in which Qaddafi fell, wanted to spend the co ž —•›¢ œ1 –˜—Ž¢ activist pursuits that prioritized Arab unity and other radical

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[16] Vandewalle, 78-83.

[17] '•Ž › Š••¢ 1•›Š—œ•Š•Ž•1Š œ 1   Ž˜ ™ •Ž •˜

[18] Vandewalle, 97.

[19] Š¢ –˜—•1 ï1 '——Ž ‹ž œ Œ 'ð 1 'Š›'œ–Šð 1 Ž Ÿ ˜•ž'˜—ð1 Š—•
 Š••Š•'1 Š —•1 *Third World Quarterly,* 6.1. (1984): 59.

ideologies. In 1975, a coup was planned, but failed to remove Qaddafi from power. Immediately following this coup attempt Qaddafi released his first volume of *The Green Book.*

'Ž1Ÿ˜•ž–Žœ1˜•1•'Ž1‹˜˜"1˜••'Œ'Š••¢1Œ˜•'•'

—'ŸŽ›œŠ•1 'Ž˜›¢ 1Š—•1œŽ›ŸŽ•1Šœ1Š1

government to rationalize its decisions and initiatives by giving them a reference point. Qaddafi solely authored the three volumes of the book, which were released in differing

•'–Žœ1•'›˜ž•'˜ž•1 '‹¢Š œ1•˜—•1›ŽŸ˜•ž•'˜–

1973-1986, as Qaddafi experimented with the political, economic, and social initiatives of this theory. The first

Ÿ˜•ž–Ž1ŒŠ••Ž•1 'Ž1 ˜•ž•'˜—1•˜˜mocracy: ›˜‹•

'Ž1 ž•'˜›'•¢1˜•1•'Ž1 Ž˜™•Ž1›Ž•ŽŠœŽ•1'–

'Ž1 ˜•ž•'˜—1•˜1•'Ž1 Œ˜—˜–'Œ1 ›˜‹•Ž

•'œ•›'‹ž•Ž•1•˜1•'Ž1™ž‹•'Œ1'—1W_]]ï1'Ž

˜Œ'Š•1 Šœ'œ1˜•1•'Ž1''›•1 —•Ž›—Š•'˜–

available in 1981.

Political Exclusion and Tribalism

During the time period of the publication of *The Green Book,* tribalism was at the heart of Libyan society. It was the

•Ž•'—'—•1™Š›•1˜•1ŽŸŽ›¢1'—•'Ÿ'•žŠ• œ1'•

'—1 Š••Š•' œ1›'•'—•1œ''—Žœ1Œ•ŽŠ››•¢1

where tribalism pervades, kinship is the most common method of distributing resources and guaranteeing cooperation. It dominates all aspects of society and determines the social hierarchy. Demonstrating this strong

•›'‹Š•1'———žŽ—ŒŽð1Š••Š'1›'•Žœð1 'Ž1

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more interaction between the state and its subjects exists and there is more use of clientele systems, kinship declines in importance as an organizing principle.[25] However, in the Libyan case there had never been much interaction between the population and the state. Italian colonial policy excluded the native Libyans. Similarly, during the Idris monarchy,

Nasser advocated for non . alignment with the East or West
• ž › ' — • 1 • ' Ž 1   ˜ • • 1   Š › ï 1   ' – ' • Š › • ¢ ð 1 ' Ž 1 • ' œ Œ
  — ' Ÿ Ž › œ Š • 1   ' Ž ˜ › ¢   1 ' — 1 ' ' œ 1   Š › Š 1 • Ž Œ • Š › Š
œ Š ' • ð 1   Ž 1 Œ Š • • 1 ' • 1 • ' Ž 1   ' ' › • 1   ' Ž ˜ › ¢ 1 • ˜ 1 ' —

political party is a contemporary form of dictatorship. It is the latest modern dictatorial instrument of government ‘Ž › Ž ‹ ¢ 1 • ‘Ž 1 ™ Š › • 1 › ž • Ž ded proceeds to give his rationale behind this critique of t ‘Ž 1 ™ ˜ • ’ • ‘ Œ Š • 1 ™ Š › • ¢ • ˜ › 1 ™ ˜ Ž › ð 1 ‘Ž 1 ˜ ™ ™ ˜ œ ’ • ’ ˜ — 1 ™ Š › • ¢ 1 – ž œ instrument of government. .... The opposition must ž — • Ž › – ’ — Ž 1 • ‘Ž 1 • ˜ Ÿ Ž › — — Ž — • œ 1 Š Œ ‘ ’ Ž Ÿ Ž – on its plans, even if these plans were beneficial to society...the interests and programs of society become victims.[33] One of the most defining characteristics of democracy, that being competition for power comprises one ˜ • 1 Š • • Š • ’ œ 1 œ • › ˜ — • Ž œ • 1 Œ › ’ • ’ š ž Ž œ 1 ˜ • 1 • ‘Ž

The following rhetoric surrounding his rejection of parties elaborates about how not only political, but all organizations that desire to have power are detrimental to society. In addition, the underlying tribal influence is seen in his concession that tribes are his preference to other forms of organiza • ’ ˜ — ï 1 Ž 1 › Ž “ Ž Œ • œ 1 ˜ › • Š — ’ £ Š • ’ ˜ — 1 ‹ ¢ class, party, tribe or sect dominates a society then the system of government becomes a dictatorship. Nevertheless, a class or a tribal coalition is preferable to a coalition of parties, since societies are almost invariably descendants of tribes.[34] This rejection of political organization essentially gives the government an open door to carry out whatever they wish with no accountability from the populace. This easily

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[32] Gathafi, *The Green Book*, 12.

[33] Ibid., 9.

[34] M. Al Gathafi, *The Green Book*, 12.

facilitates an authoritarian style of governance by removing all barriers that the government must take into account with regard to decision-making. In fact, Lisa Anderson goes as far

Š œ 1 • ˜ 1 › Ž • Ž › 1 • ˜ 1 ' ' œ 1 ™ ˜ • ' • ' Œ Š • 1 ™ ˜ œ ' • ' ˜ — 1

makes the claim that his removal of any sort of political contestation has deepened the tribal social structure of the country.[35]

In lieu of political parties Qaddafi advocated for a direct democracy, formed through popular committees. He

œ • Š • Ž • œ ð G *The Green Book* shows the masses the way to direct democracy based on a magnificent and practical system: the

' ' › • 1 — ' Ÿ Ž › œ Š • 1 ŽŽ 1 ˜ › ¢ ï • Ž ð 1 ' Ž 1 Š ž • ' ˜ › ' • ¢ ˜

people has just one face, and this can only be realized by one method . • ' Ž 1 Ž œ • Š ‹ • ' œ ' – Ž — 1 ˜ • 1 Ž ˜ ™ • Ž œ 1

Ž ˜ ™ • Ž œ 1 ˜ — — Ÿ • Ž Ž¢ œ Ž 1 Ž[37] As kinship defines all social organization in a society pervaded by tribalism, organizations outside of the tribe and family, like political parties, Qaddafi rejected as a tool of the government to exploit its people. However, this broad network of

Œ ˜ — — ' • • Ž Ž œ 1 – Š ' — • ¢ 1 › Ž ™ › Ž œ Ž — • Ž • 1 • ' Ž 1 ™

œ Ž — œ Ž 1 Š œ 1 Š — • Ž Š • • Ž œ • Š • Ž œ ð 1 ' Ž 1

committee system was an attempt by Qaddafi to bypass the

– ˜ › Ž 1 › Ž • • Š › ' £ Ž • 1 ™ › ˜ Œ Ž • ž •[38] Essentially, the 1

elimination of po • ' • ' Œ Š • 1 ™ Š › ' Ž œ 1 Š — • 1 Š • ˜ ™ • '

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[35] ' œ Š 1 — • Ž › œ ˜ — ð 1 - Š Š ˆ Š Š ˜ ñ11 Š • ' — • 1 *Journal of International Affairs,* 54.2. (2001): 1.

[36] Gathafi, *The Green Book,* 17.

[37] Ibid., 17.

[38] Vandewalle, 100.

direct democracy through popular committees placed the country directly in the hands of those at the top.

'Ž1 ‹˜•'•'˜—1˜•1 ˜Œ'Ž•¢ œ1 —œ•ŠŸŽ–

Qaddafi stressed in *The Green Book* that an economic system based around monetary wages must be inherently evil and a form of enslavement. This meant that a direct exchange of goods must replace monetary wages, which, as previously mentioned, harkened back to tribal roots.

˜ ŽŸŽ›ð1 '•1 Š•œ˜1 •˜˜"1 Š œ¡œ˜Ž˜ to œ1 new Š‹1

extreme. As state commanded businesses define a socialist state, Qaddafi pushed Arab socialism to a new extreme

œŠ¢'—•ð1 ŸŽ—1 œ•Š•Ž1 ˜ —Ž•1 ŽŒ˜—˜–

workers wages and other social benefits which are more like charitable offerings donated by rich owners of private

ŽŒ˜—˜–'Œ1Žœ•Š‹•‹'œ'‘–Ž—•œ³⁴1•˜1'Ž'›1Ž–™™

˜›1 Š••Š•'ð1 •'Ž1 •›Š•'•'˜—Š•1 •˜›–œ˜1

shortcoming were that it used wages to compensate its workers. The logic behind his rejection of wages was explained throughout the second volume of the book. He considered the relationship that wage earners have with the entity that pays them their wages to be like that of a master

Š—•1Š1œ•ŠŸŽï1 Š•Ž1ŽŠ›—Ž›œ1Š›Ž1‹ž•1

''›Ž1•'Ž–ð 1 'Ž1 ›˜ are temporary slaves, and their

servitude lasts as long as the duration of their work for

''Œ''1 •'Ž¢1 ›ŽŒŽ'ŸŽ1 Š•Žœ1 •›˜–[40]‘Ž'Ž'›1

Œ˜—•'—žŽ•ð1 'Ž1 žŠŠ•Š•Ž1 œ˜•ž•'˜—1 'œ1

[39] Gathafi, *The Green Book,* 32-33.

[40] Gathafi, *The Green Book*, 32.

his ideology. He denounced all political organizations in lieu of the *Jamahiriyya*, eliminating political contestation and accountability within the government. He reverted back to tribal roots and the influence of Nasser shines through as he called for the elimination of a wage earning system that would place the nations workforce in the hands of the government. His insistence upon the individual staying

'•''—1 •'Ž1 •Š–'•¢ œ1 œ˜Œ'Š•1 œ•›žŒ•ž›Ž

within traditional gender roles reflects tribal roots and has some Nasser-like undertones while discouraging the formation of organizations which could challenge the government. Using these unrelated yet pivotal influences, he created a state with all of its power concentrated at the top.

''•Ž1 Š••Š•' œ1 ™˜•'•'ŒŠ•1 ™''•˜œ˜™'

through his rhetoric in *The Green Book*, the political reality of Libya under his rule proved to be quite divergent from the

Jamahiriyya. The understanding of the influences behind

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how using the rhetoric of *The Green Book* he was enabled to create a society in which he and his elite circle held reigns of the country. Unfortunately for the people of Libya, the government he created was not unlike the Italian colonial rule and the Idris monarchy that his political philosophy was constructed to oppose and diverge the country away from. Once again, the citizenry was left disenfranchised from any sort of role in governance.

As late night comedians continue to search for new material and as the images of • ‘ Ž 1 › Š ‹ 1 œ ™ › ’ — • 1 Š — • 1 mutilated body leave our minds, the larger implications of

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Condemned but not Coerced: The Active Resistance of Interracial Couples in Nazi Germany
Fascist Europe in the 20th Century

Lanier Flanders

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Ž — 1 ˜ – – Š — • – Ž — • œ 1 • ˜ › 1 ' ˜ ˜ œ This popular Š › • – Nazis rhetoric, coupled with educational curriculum often taught in racial science classes, expressed ideological beliefs surrounding love, marriage, and racial attraction in the ' ' › • 1 Ž ' Œ ' ï 1 — Ž 1 Œ ˜ – – Š — • Š • – ˜ — ' œ ' Ž œ 1

determined attraction and trumped emoti ˜—ï1 Š››¢1 ˜—
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™•Š¢–Š•ūŦurthermore, this message insinuated that love could only exist between Aryan individuals. While these directives did not directly target Jews, they indirectly condemned mixed marriages as invalid, impure, and even treacherous against the state. Although these commands were portrayed in the guise of light-hearted advice, the gravity of their message cannot be ignored. This rhetoric was a part of a systematic effort to regulate marriage according to discriminatory racial, hereditary, and behavioral rules and ›Ž™›ŽœŽ—•Ž•1•'Ž1œ•Š•Ž œ1'—•Ž—•'˜—Š• choices based on love, personal preference, and attraction.

On September 15, 1935 the National Socialist German W˜›"Ž› œ1 Š›•¢1 •ŽŸŽŒ—ŵ•ĕ Žŧ attitudes in Germany. The Reich Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of German Blood and German Honor were introduced at the annual party rally in Nuremberg with minimal public opposition.[3] Collectively known as the Nuremberg Race

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Laws, this comprehensive legislation disenfranchised German Jews and divested them of their political and civil rights. It prohibited individuals classified as Jews from marrying marryve vyvm exs. clvvn disenfnced iv ( )-13vAg maan1

The blood purity laws differed from other anti-Semitic legislation because they affected non-Jews as well as Jews. If these laws were fully enforced, they would break the sacred bond of marriage, tear apart families, and terminate romantic relationships. As a result, the regime had to

community filled with racially pure Aryans.[9] Yet, due to the sensitive nature of these inter-ethnic unions, bureaucratic officials hesitated to fully enforce the separation of these couples. Separation of spouses would undermine the integrity of traditional institutions such as family, marriage, and religion, and spark fear amongst the general public. As the regime vacillated over appropriate, discreet measures to enforce racial purity, interracial couples seized the opportunity to resist the complete breakdown of privacy. ••'–Š•Ž•¢ð1•'Ž1•Š™1‹Ž• ŽŽ—1•'Ž1 ɱǎ•'–Ž cautious practice created a small, yet crucial, space for couples to preserve their privacy and sense of individualism.

Interracial relationships were not totally repressed or eliminated, but were resilient to governmental intrusion. The couples in these condemned partnerships developed strategies to navigate imposed regulations and reconstruct alternative forms of privacy despite persecution and punishment. The personal narratives of individuals affected by the Nuremberg Laws reveal covert resistance in the form of superficial accommodation necessary for the survival of ˜—Ž œ1–Š››'Š•Žò1•'ŽœŽ1Œ˜ž™•Žœ1Š™™ state by demonstrating outward cooperation and compliance, yet inwardly affirmed their personal values. This reconstruction of the public and private realms served as a primary coping mechanism that granted all Germans,

percent of Jewish men married non-Jews, while eighteen percent of Jewish women married non-Jews.[13] Then in 1933, th1 086(Jew)6(i)11(s)4(h)-287(me)-7(n)-28m[( ] TJ. fact ℏ)-287(D46(J

race.[16] Nazi gender and race hierarchy intersected at the site of interethnic marriages; according to this misogynistic hierarchy, men were superior to women, whereas Aryans were superior to Jews. Interethnic marriages problematized this schema for social control, especially in the case of Aryan women married to Jewish men. Although Aryan women were not victimized to the extent of Jews, they were marginalized by the patriarchal social structure. This hierarchy meant women were confined to restrictive domestic roles, whereas men trained for the military or pursued civic roles. Likewise, it also implied that all other non-Aryan races were degenerate. While women supervised the small, private sphere of the household with only limited access to the public realm via charitable organizations and the church, men controlled crucial matters such as politics,

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emphasized the centrality of the child to the success of the
regime: the movement   ó 1 ' Š œ 1 ' — 1 › Ž Š • ' • ¢ 1 ‹ ž • 1 ˜ — Ž
and that point is the child, that tiny creature which is born

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or fear. On the other hand the *mischlinge*, children of mixed marriages, were socially unacceptable targets of criticism and scorn. In the Third Reich, marriage became a utilitarian goal for the maintenance and procreation of the Aryan race, and anyone who opposed this agenda faced grave consequences.

Nazis social policies revolutionized the purpose and function of the private home. Traditionally, Victorian gender ideology had posed marriage and family as the symbolic bastions that insulate its members from the corrosive public sphere. The patriarchal nuclear family was responsible for inculcating children with values of individuality, privacy, and dignity.[20] Yet state agencies and educational programs, such as the Hitler Youth, the League of German Girls, and the *Lebensborn* program, replaced the traditional parenting role, and ousted the necessity of the family as a source of educational and emotional support. Although the regime advocated for the revitalization of the traditional family, t. advhoug

family with a collective allegiance to the Führer and the nation. In order to coordinate commitment to the *Volk*, ideological and political unity among the citizens was the key to fomenting solidarity and strength. Families that disrupted the political and social agenda of the Nazis would weaken this collective allegiance. In this schema, interracial families functioned as a direct, internal threat to national aspirations. Ultimately, the heart of the Nazi revolution lay in the destruction of individualism and privacy and the construction of a collective, public racial consciousness.[22]

Privileged versus Non-Privileged Marriages

The rules and regulations that monitored interracial relations operated according to the limitations of the rigid Nazi patriarchal structure. Two criteria were developed to distinguish between privileged and non-privileged Jews: the religious affiliation of the children and the race of the mother.[23] These stipulations reflected the inherent sexist notions of the party because the status of the marriage depended upon the race and religion of the husband.[24] The hyper-masculine Nazis erroneously considered children of Ž ' œ ' 1 • Š • ' Ž › œ 1 – ˜ › Ž 1 Ž ' œ ' 1 • ' Š — 1 Œ ' mothers. Ironically, this flawed standard directly

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[22] Ibid., 179.

[23] Stolzfus, *Resistance of the Heart*, 70.

[24] Ibid., 103.

newspaper haunted her and served as a visible reminder of her dangerous predicament. Once, she and the other employees were required to complete a questionnaire that measured their reliability to the Nazis cause. It asked questions regarding the employ Ž Ž œ 1 œ ™ ˜ ž œ Ž 1 œ ž Œ ' • ˜ Ž œ 1 ¢ ˜ ž › 1 ' ž œ ‹ Š — • 1 ˜ › ” õ 1 ˜ › 1 ' Š • 1 ' — Œ ˜ ignored these questions, but was further interrogated by her   Ž › œ ˜ — Š • 1   ' › Ž Œ • ˜ › ï 1   ž › ' — • 1 • ' ' œ 1 ' — • › ž œ answers were allusive and vague, and she never yielded to authoritarian pressure. Her resolve to remain silent in this censored environment was a bold act of agency.

Individuals as Active Agents

Each experience for interracial couples and *Mischlinge* in the Third Reich was idiosyncratic and demonstrated varying degrees of covert resistance, accommodation, and direct opposition. The strategies utilized to reconstruct a space of privacy varied from person to person. Religious conversions, secret escapes, emigration, hideaways, baptisms, and even divorce were some tactics used for resistance and survival. Nevertheless, these stories collectively illustrate how interracial couples maintained

background until 1932 at the formative age of ten.[33] With this
realization, Frau Groth felt with crystal clarity the conclusion
of her childhood innocence. Her father Dr. Goldmann lost
his job as the medical director in Stuttgart and the family
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thankfully saved the family from the pits of Auschwitz, but
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self-esteem. The impact of this social exclusion was
challenging; Frau Groth remembered witnessing her father
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desk sat my father, sobbing like a child. He was so very
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Stripped of his citizenship, Dr. Goldman retreated from

accommodation; she projected her public Aryan identity to
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morale.

Other underlying social, economic, and relational
factors, under external Nazi pressure, threatened interracial
relationships. Rita Kuhn, another *Mischlinge* who lived in
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Her Jewish identity was not a conscious realization until the
Nazi take-over. In January of 1933, her world quickly
changed when her Jewish father lost his job and the state
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class background saved the family from total persecution,
but this financial burden, in addition to a general
atmosphere of fear and terror, placed additional pressures
on the couple. Rita remembered that an environment of

marriage and loyalty to her husband, actively resisted Nazi requests, and in return the state backed down.

Unfortunately, Edward Adler did not receive the same lenient treatment from the Nazi state. As a Jewish teenager living in Hamburg, Germany, he was reported to the Gestapo for going on a date with a Gentile girl.[50] The two were out camping and had planned to kayak and picnic for the afternoon. Another young man observed the couple and reported this illegal behavior. Although his interference may have been an act of party loyalty, more likely than not Edward surmised it was merely the result of a rivalry for the ·'›· œ1 Š··Ž—·˜—ï1 œ1 Š1 ›Žrested·by1the· Š›· Gestapo and spent six months in solitary confinement.[51] This traumatic encounter shattered his boyhood innocence, as Edward experienced first-hand the intrusive surveillance powers of the Nazis.

Censorship and Surveillance

For interracial couples, the Gestapo posed a real and perceived threat of intrusion. The highly interconnected relationship between the Gestapo and German society enabled the strict surveillance and regulation of societal behavior; Germans generally perceived the Gestapo to be an

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[50] Edward Adl Ž›ð1 —1 —·Ž›Ÿ'Ž1 '·'1 *United States Holocaust Memorial Museum* (1992), http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_oi.php?MediaId=2711 (accessed 15 February, 2014).
[51] Ibid.

omnipresent authority, capable of detecting the slightest aversion and antipathy towards the regime. This climate of fear and rumor enabled the relative success of totalitarian

doctrine, while others had utilized this terror apparatus as a means to their own personal ends.

The Gestapo case files for the region of Dusseldorf in northwestern Germany from 1933 to 1944 exemplify the necessity of cooperation between ordinary citizens and state officials to invade the private sphere. This invasive surveillance relied on the accusations of neighbors, friends, and co-workers. These files contain 137 individuals who had sexual relations with Jews, 40 files on persons who were suspected of having sexual relations, and an additional 225 cases of Jews who were arrested for these reasons.[54] Most cases concerned extramarital affairs. Aryans found guilty were sentenced to approximately one year in prison, while Jews were sent to forced labor camps.[55] These numbers indicate that sexual relations with Jews continued despite its illegal nature, perhaps because these individuals recognized these relationships as valid behavior incriminated by the Nazi state.[56] Those suspected of indecency were often targeted by witnesses for political or personal reasons. According to Gestapo protocol, three or more testimonies were required to denounce an opponent and proceed with charges. If the case lacked conclusive evidence (i.e. three or more confirming testimonies), then the accused were

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[54] Sarah Gordon, ʻ•• Ž › ð 1 Ž › – Š — œ ð 1 Š — • 1 ð ʻ Ž û Ž ʼ ʼ- œ Œ 1 Ž ž ž ñ ñ 1 ˜ ̟ - University Press, 1984), 211.
[55] Ibid., 241.
[56] Ibid., 302 .

dismissed with a stern warning and the guaranteed promise of future surveillance.[57]

An analysis of the demographics of the accused in Dusseldorf reveals that the majority of cases concerned men ages 30-39 employed in white-collar jobs or independent, small businesses. Jewish men were often targets of false accusations, but conversely the regime was reluctant to arrest non-Jewish women for the same crime. In this scenario, the patriarchal structure functioned to protect women from arbitrary arrests. The ratio of Jew to non-Jew arrests for males was very similar and can possibly be attributed to the greater mobility afforded to men in the public realm, therefore increasing their opportunities for sexual relations outside the home.[58] Of course, some interracial unions may have been the result of sexual attraction without a conscious political agenda. In reality an ʼ—•ʼŸʼ•žŠ• œ1•ŽŸŽ•1˜•1 Ž ʼœʻ—Žœœ 1Œˆ˜ on outward physical characteristics. Despite the warnings of Nazi pseudo-scientific racial theories, even people who considered themselves loyal to the Nazis party could fall for a French-speaking, blond Jewish woman.[59] Motivations for opposition varied person to person becausŽ1 ó1 œŽ¡žŠ relations with Jews were much more personal, even idiosyncratic expressions of disagreement with Nazi racial ™˜•ʼŒˆ¢Ë The multiplicity of these scenarios and their

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[57] Ibid.,213.

[58] Ibid., 218.

[59] Gordon, 212

[60] Ibid., 236.

underlying motivations cannot be neatly categorized. Allegations of *Rasenschande* criminalized highly intimate, private behavior and publicized these activities as the ultimate political insult. Yet the proliferation of these cases proves that Nazi ideology failed to totally abolish the individual agency of German citizens. Ultimately, individuals desired the freedom to choose their romantic partner based on individual preferences rather than comply with the nationally sanctioned partner.

Nevertheless, this highly politicized crime warranted

Mischlinge in the Final Solution.[67] Officer Eichmann, an SS-*Obersturmbannführer* (Lieutenant Colonel) oversaw the deportation of Jews in Berlin.[68] As demonstrated by the Dusseldorf cases, the most cautionary and unobtrusive approach to accomplish this task was the individual arrests and detainments of each suspect. The SS held a majority of suspects of the arrested suspects in protective custody for up to three months.[69] By requesting names and addresses of intermarried families from community churches, synagogues, and the Jewish Community Center, the Gestapo pieced together a network of insubordinates. As of September 1942, there were only 4,723 intermarried Jews

The fact that this protest is the only documented occurrence of public, non-violent resistance to Nazi authority during the Third Reich is significant. Since 1933, the Maintenance of Public Quiet and Security Law had banned all public gatherings without prior permission, so naturally the freedom of assembly and protest were non-existent in this fascist state, and any attempts to do so were highly dangerous. Even so, these women stood stoically for an entire week in the face of armed SS troops. It was an unprecedented act of open defiance, and the only incident of notable protest against the deportation of German Jews.[77]

Rosenstrasse Street Protest: Effects and Aftermath

A closer examination of the Nazi Regime sheds light on their apparent concession to the *Rosenstrasse* Protest. The need to maintain public order, approval, and an aura of secrecy served as possible motivations to comply with the housewives. Despite its totalitarian structure, the ability of the Nazi government to micromanage society depended on the appearance of public approval. For most ordinary citizens, the exact details of the methods employed to implement racial purification were never fully disclosed. Hitler recognized, like any savvy politician, that popular support stabilized power.[78] Even Gestapo officers and party ˜••'Œ'Š•œ1›Ž•›Š'—Ž•1›˜−1 œ'˜™1•Š•"1 ' their homes. Programs of racial purification, such as

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euthanasia and deportations, depended not only upon the secrecy of the Nazi Regime in conducting these operations, but also the consent of the public.[79] Of course, consent in this case must be equated to a general ignorance and apathy amongst civilians due to high levels of government secrecy. Nevertheless, the foundation of this fascist state ironically rested on the stability of popular opinion. Any sign of dissent jeopardized the legitimacy of its programs and policies. Therefore, any interruption to or disclosure of racial purification plans such as Operation Factory Action would rupture the protective insulation of secrecy and uninformed support. Perhaps Nazi authorities were reluctant to fire on the German wives, least they make sympathetic martyrs of their cause.

The release of these intermarried Jews and *Mischlinge* demonstrates the apparent gap between Nazi racial ideology and implementation. The specific social dynamic of the protest enabled its success. Unarmed Aryan women, as ˜ ™ ™ ˜ œ Ž • 1 • ˜ 1 Š › – Ž • 1 ˜ • œ ' Ž Ÿ ' " œ ð 1 Ž œ ð 1 ˜ › served as the face of public opposition. The urban location of this event increased the likelihood of national and international attention, and any sort of violent measure certainly would have resulted in global outrage. In addition, perhaps the Nazis viewed this incident as a minor setback not worth consideration in the scheme of total war and

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[79] Stolzfus, 262.

extended beyond her own individual cause.[82] This success, while relatively minor in the scheme of Nazi brutalities, implies that traditions of marriage and family grounded in religious and social customs ran deeper than values imposed by National Socialism.[83] Ultimately, the Nazi party could not completely sever the social ties grounded on love, honor, family, and unity. The fascist government could not totally eradicate individual choice and agency, or fully penetrate the private sphere, because inner-resolve served as a

women created when united in the spirit of protest and the purpose of liberation. The inscription on the sculptures

Fig. 1: Ingeborg Hunz